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COMMENT
Electric Vehicles and Time-of-Use Rates:
The Impending Role of the New York State
Public Service Commission in Regulating our
Transportation Future
JAKE SELIGMAN *

I. THE FIGHT AGAINST FUEL INFLEXIBILITY
The United States has a transportation problem. With over
250 million registered vehicles 1 demanding more than seventy
percent of the country’s total oil supply, 2 the U.S. transportation
sector 3 sits precariously at the center of both environmental and
national security issues. The sector’s overwhelming reliance on
* Jake Seligman is a Learned and Augustus Hand Fellow at Pace
University School of Law and a Climate and Energy Fellow at the Yale School of
Forestry & Environmental Studies where he is pursuing a Master of
Environmental Management degree.
He received his B.S. from Cornell
University and focuses his work on energy law and project finance. He would
like to thank James Van Nostrand, Executive Director of the Pace Energy and
Climate Center, for his generous support throughout the research and writing
process.
1. Table 1-11: Number of U.S. Aircraft, Vehicles, Vessels, and Other
Conveyances, U.S. DEP’T. OF TRANSP., RESEARCH AND INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN.,
BUREAU
OF
TRANSP.
STATISTICS,
http://www.bts.gov/publications/
national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01_11.html (last visited Oct. 25,
2010).
2. Oil: Crude and Petroleum Products Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=oil_home# tab2 (last
visited Oct. 25, 2010) (the transportation sector consumes 8,997,000 barrels/day
(378 million gallons/day)).
3. The transportation sector is comprised of vehicles that move goods or
people, including boats, aircraft, and rail. This article focuses on automobiles
and light trucks, which account for sixty percent of the transportation sector’s
energy demand. See Use of Energy in the United States Explained, Energy Use
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
for
Transportation,
U.S.
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=us_energy_transportati
on (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
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oil presents the most difficult challenge to achieving the twin
aims of energy independence and significantly reduced
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, not because it is the largest
energy-consuming sector (it is not) 4 or because its combustion
process produces more GHG emissions than electricity
generators’ combustion (it does not), 5 but because of its inherent
inflexibility.
Unlike electricity generation that can, and increasingly
does, come from cleaner domestic options like natural gas, solar,
wind, geothermal, and nuclear, the transportation sector is built
around the combustion engine, which requires an almostunwavering commitment to oil. Potential alternatives to oil such
as ethanol and biodiesel have yet to conclusively prove their
worth on an environmental or economic basis. 6 Hydrogen has
continued to remain just beyond the range of feasible fuel
alternatives, and investors have made little effort to jumpstart
the infrastructure overhaul its widespread use would require. 7
However, the transportation sector is by no means stuck with oil.
Indeed, the automobile industry has already developed a viable
alternative: electric vehicles.
Within the next four years, nearly every major car company
will have a grid-enabled vehicle (GEV) 8 on the market. 9 While
4. See Use of Energy in the United States Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=us_ energy_use
(last visited Oct. 25, 2009) (the transportation sector consumes 29% of total
energy in the U.S. whereas the industrial sector consumes 30%, the commercial
sector consumes 19%, and the residential sector consumes 22%).
5. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS
AND
SINKS:
1990-2008
3-6
(2010),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads10/US-GHG-Inventory2010_Report.pdf (in 2008, total GHG emissions from electricity generation were
2374.3 Tg CO2 Eq. and total GHG emissions from transportation were 1813.4 Tg
CO2 Eq).
6. See The Future of Biofuels: The Post-Alcohol World, ECONOMIST, Oct. 28,
2010, at 84.
7. For a discussion of the failures of hydrogen-fueled vehicles, see Hydrogen
Tries
Again,
ECONOMIST,
Apr.
23,
2010,
available
at
http://www.economist.com/node/15981031.
8. “Grid-enabled vehicle” is a term that includes both electric vehicles,
which have only an electric motor, and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, which
can run on gasoline and battery like current full hybrids, but can recharge from
an outlet, which greatly increases fuel economy.
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diffusion of GEVs in the marketplace is in its nascent stages,
their potential market penetration could be great, given the
comparable costs to current combustion vehicles, high oil prices,
and the increasing awareness of the environmental issues and
costs associated with burning fossil fuels. In March 2009,
President Obama set aside over two billion dollars in competitive
grants for electric vehicle manufacturers in furtherance of his
goal of having one million plug-in hybrid electric vehicles
(PHEVs) on the road by 2015. 10
By shifting the source of energy from oil combustion to
electricity generation, widespread GEV use would combat the
transportation sector’s fuel-inflexibility problem. The energy
supply of vehicles that rely on the grid for their power is coupled
to the electric grid’s energy supply, and no longer tied to one fuel.
Although much of the country’s electricity transmission and
distribution grid is fueled primarily by coal combustion 11, the grid
(unlike current cars) has options. Not only can policies like
carbon regulation and renewable portfolio standards, which
mandate renewable energy inclusion in state energy portfolios,
help renewable energy increase its role in the electricity supply
mix, but converting coal plants into cleaner-burning natural gas
facilities makes increasing business sense as the costs of pollution
increase and the price of natural gas decreases. Additionally,
many electric utilities offer clean energy options, whereby a
customer can elect to purchase electrons (or at least credits for
those electrons) from renewable sources. 12 In other words, GEV
9. See John Halliwell, Plug-in Vehicles: A New Way of Thinking about the
Electric Grid, Presentation at the New York State Energy Research and
Development Authority’s Environmental Monitoring, Evaluation and Protection
Conference,
(Oct.
15,
2009),
available
at
http://www.nyserda.org/
programs/Environment/EMEP/conference_2009/presentations/Halliwell_John_P
lug-In%20Vehicles%20A%20New%20Way%20of%20Thinking%20about%
20the%20Electric%20Grid.pdf (slides from presentation available at this link).
10. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Remarks of President Barack
Obama at Southern California Edison Electric Vehicle Technical Center (Mar.
19, 2009), available at http://www.energy.gov/7067.htm.
11. See Net Generation by Energy Source: Total (All Sectors), U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epm/table1_1.html (last
visited, Nov. 10, 2010).
12. See,
e.g.,
ConEd
Solutions
NYC,
CMTY.
ENERGY,
http://www.communityenergyinc.com/NYC (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
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penetration would give drivers access to a wide array of cleaner,
more sustainable, domestic fuels.
Increasing
reliance
on
electricity
generation
for
transportation fuel is not without its challenges. For widespread
GEV adoption to be successful, battery-charging infrastructure
must also be widespread, with an emphasis on in-home charging
stations and, to a lesser extent, workplace and publicly accessible
charging stations. While the infrastructure implications are
exciting, it remains unclear how an electrification ecosystem will
actually look. What is clear is that GEVs will add stress to the
electric grid, as car owners will demand more electricity.
The size of GEVs’ impact on the grid varies along with
market share predictions. According to the Department of
Energy’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), GEVs will
have a twenty-five percent share of the automobile market by
2020. 13 ORNL projects that, by 2030, New York 14 alone will have
2.42 million GEVs on the road. 15 The Electric Power Research
Institute (EPRI) used twenty percent by 2050 market share as a
low estimate, employed a medium market share of sixty-two
percent by 2050 and a high market share of eighty percent by
2050 in its study of the environmental benefits of GEVs. 16
Regardless of which market penetration is most likely, the
immediate environmental benefits of this shift away from oil
combustion are significant (although largely beyond the scope of
this article).
As Chart 1 shows, depending on the electricity fuel source,
2010 GHG emission levels could fall by anywhere from twentyeight percent to sixty-seven percent per vehicle when a GEV is

13. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OAK RIDGE NAT’L LAB., POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF
PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC VEHICLES ON REGIONAL POWER GENERATION 6 (2008),
available at www.ornl.gov/info/ornlreview/v41_1_08/regional_phev_ analysis.pdf
[hereinafter POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC VEHICLES].
14. This article will continue to focus on New York as an example as it is a
state that faces many of the challenges that GEV’s pose to the electric grid and
regulators.
15. POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC VEHICLES, supra note 13,
at 6.
16. ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST. & NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL,
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC VEHICLES 4-6 (2007),
available at mydocs.epri.com/docs/public/000000000001015325.pdf.
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substituted for a conventional vehicle. 17 The GHG reductions
increase over time and, by 2050, the reductions per car average
closer to sixty-seven percent. 18
Chart 1 19

II. PROTECTING ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS
THROUGH TIME-OF-USE RATES
Along with the environmental benefits of market penetration
comes the challenge of effectively managing GEV electricity use
to ensure that those environmental benefits are realized and that
electricity price spikes are avoided. Ironically, these complex
threats of price spikes and unrealized environmental benefits

17. Id. at 5-2.
18. Id.
19. Id. (Figure 5-1).
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stem from a simple question that GEV owners will have to
answer every day: what is the best time to recharge the car?
GEV owners will likely want to plug in as soon as they are
near a suitable outlet in order to keep their cars charged for
future use. 20 For many GEV owners this will mean plugging in
their cars when they return home from work and pull into their
garages. Unfortunately, this occurs during the evening peak in
electricity demand, 21 which usually falls between the hours of
4:00 P.M. and 7:00 P.M. 22 During these hours (along with the
morning peak hours), 23 electricity demand is at its highest. As
the blue line in Chart 2 shows, GEVs charging in the evening
hours would cause a substantial spike in the electricity demand
curve. 24
Chart 2 25

20. See POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC VEHICLES, supra
note 13, at 9.
21. See id.
22. See Frequently Asked Questions- Electricity, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/ask/electricity_faqs.asp#peak_demand (last visited Dec.
23, 2010) (providing access to daily load/demand profiles for various
Independent System Operators).
23. Typically from 7:00 A.M. until 9:00 or 10:00 A.M. See id.
24. POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC VEHICLES, supra note 13,
at 16.
25. Id.
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In a restructured state like New York, where generating
facilities bid into the wholesale electricity market at their
respective market-clearing prices, as demand for electricity
increases, so does the wholesale price of electricity. 26 As the
wholesale price of electricity rises, more expensive generating
facilities can profitably bid in at a market-clearing price. 27
Therefore, by adding to the peak demand for electricity, GEVs
would drive up the peak electricity price, ultimately leading to
higher rates for customers. From an environmental perspective,
the results are even less desirable, as the plants that come online
only to meet peak demand tend to be the least efficient and
dirtiest facilities on the grid (i.e. old oil generators). 28
The question then becomes: how do utilities and regulators,
who represent the links between GEV owners and the wholesale
generation market, smooth out the evening peak to mitigate these
undesirable economic and environmental results? The simple
answer is: by designing electricity rates to encourage GEV owners
to plug-in during off-peak hours when there is plenty of cheaper
base-load capacity available.
In June 2009, the New York Independent System Operator
(NYISO), a not-for-profit corporation that manages New York’s
electricity transmission grid and oversees the state’s wholesale
electricity market, conducted a study on the potential impacts of
GEVs on the grid, and recognized the importance of reducing the
predicted spike in peak demand. 29 As peak demand for electricity
tends to be as much as fifty percent greater than off-peak
demand, the grid has “a significant amount of excess generation
26. See James M. Griffin & Steven L. Puller, A Primer on Electricity and the
Economics of Deregulation, in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND
CHALLENGES 1, 12-14 (James M. Griffin & Steven L. Puller eds., 2005). See also
Paul L. Joskow, The Difficult Transition to Competitive Electricity Markets in
the United States, in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND CHALLENGES 31,
38-39 (James M. Griffin & Steven L. Puller eds., 2005) (illustrating the
components of a competitive electricity market).
27. See Griffin & Puller, supra note 26, at 12-13.
28. See POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC VEHICLES, supra
note 13, at 19-25. See also Griffin & Puller, supra note 26, at 13 (demonstrating
the electricity supply profile at various levels of marginal cost).
29. N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, ALTERNATE ROUTE: ELECTRIFYING THE
TRANSPORTATION SECTOR: POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC
VEHICLES ON NEW YORK STATE’S ELECTRICITY SYSTEM 11 (2009).
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capacity compared to demand” during off-peak hours. 30 In other
words, off-peak electricity is substantially cheaper than peak
electricity as there is far less demand for it.
If given the choice between paying to charge their GEVs
during peak pricing hours or off-peak pricing hours, car owners
would have a strong incentive to charge off- peak. 31 But,
residential customers typically do not face that choice. Currently,
almost all residential customers pay a flat rate all day and night,
and thereby have no incentive to reduce usage during peak hours.
The type of rate schedule that allows for a more sophisticated,
informed choice is called “Time-of-Use,” 32 and by opting in to this
rate schedule, utility customers pay one of two electricity prices
depending on the time of day. 33 In most cases, the peak and offpeak prices differ widely (with peak prices being much higher
than off-peak prices), 34 heavily incentivizing the customer to shift
use away from the peak hours and on to the off-peak times.
While each utility defines its off-peak price and hours differently,
generally off-peak hours are from 10:00 P.M. until 7:00 A.M., and
sometimes again in the midday hours for residential customers. 35
Weekends are almost always considered off-peak. 36
Although all major utilities offer voluntary time-of-use rate
schedules, the vast majority of residential customers do not opt
in. For example, according to Con Edison, a New York utility
providing electricity to roughly 3.2 million customers, 37 “[a]s of
30. Id. at 9.
31. Con Edison’s summertime peak rate is 26.19 c/kWh, while its off peak
rate is 1.01 c/kWh. See CONSOL. EDISON, INC., SERVICE CLASSIFICATION NO. 1:
RESIDENTIAL AND RELIGIOUS 3 (2008), available at http://www.coned.com/
documents/elec/201-210.pdf [hereinafter SERVICE CLASSIFICATION NO. 1].
32. Guy R. Newsham & Brent G. Bowker, The Effect of Utility Time-Varying
Pricing and Load Control Strategies on Residential Summer Peak Electricity
Use: A Review, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 3289, 3290 (2010).
33. Id.
34. See Severin Borenstein, Time-Varying Retail Electricity Prices: Theory
and Practice, in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND CHALLENGES 317, 327
(James M. Griffin & Steven L. Puller eds., 2005).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Investor Information, Corporate Profile, CONSOL. EDISON. INC.,
http://investor.conedison.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=61493&p=irol-homeprofile (last
visited Oct. 25, 2010).
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June 30, 2009, there were 2,337 customers taking service under
the SC 1 voluntary time-of-day rate program.” 38 Disregarding
the lack of public awareness that time-of-use rates are even an
option, this underutilization makes intuitive sense because most
customers require electricity at peak times and their demand is
relatively inelastic.
For instance, while residential customers could shift
activities such as using laundry machines or dishwashers to offpeak hours, appliances like refrigerators stay on regardless of the
time of day. Similarly, many activities like using a blow dryer in
the morning or turning on the lights after getting home from
work can only take place during peak hours. Moreover, even if a
residential customer decided that he could shift much of his
electricity use to off-peak hours, the calculation to determine
whether switching to time-of-use rates would be cheaper than
staying on a fixed rate would be a complicated endeavor. A
customer would have little certainty as to whether switching to
time-of-use rates would actually prove to be cheaper.
But, there has rarely been a situation that so clearly calls for
the adoption of time-of-use rates as the impending growth in GEV
ownership. The amount of electricity required to charge a GEV,
coupled with how easy it would be to charge one during off-peak
hours, would make GEV owners ideal candidates for time-of-use
rates. Incentivizing GEV charging away from the peak would not
only alleviate some of the environmental problems associated
with the dirtier generating units that are only economical during
peak hours, but it would also increase demand for cheap
generation that runs during off-peak hours. 39
In New York, much of this cheap, off-peak generation comes
from wind, a clean, renewable source of energy that produces
most of its electricity during off-peak hours, as wind tends to blow
more consistently at night. 40 Not only would charging GEVs offpeak help reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but the increased
demand (and concurrent increased price) for wind energy would
38. Response to Interrogatories, Case No. 09-E-0428 (July 28, 2009) (on file
with author).
39. See Griffin & Puller, supra note 26, at 13 (demonstrating the electricity
supply profile at various levels of marginal cost).
40. See N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, supra note 29, at 8.
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also make it more economically viable as an investment for
developers. This ideal situation of wind-GEV synergy in New
York, illustrated by Chart 3, can only work if GEV owners do
most of their charging off-peak.
Chart 3 41

III. CREATING A RATE CLASS AND THE
REGULATORY COMPACT: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
How, then, can regulators ensure that utilities charge GEV
owners on a time-of-use rate schedule rather than the traditional
flat-rate residential schedule? The simple answer is by grouping
GEV owners into a new rate class, or group of customers charged
on the same basis. To fully display the legal and political
implications of creating a rate class, this section will discuss
ratemaking generally and, then, more specifically, it will explore
the powers of a regulatory body to create a new rate class. Again,
the focus will be on New York as an example, although most of
the legal and political issues will arise in any state with a
significant market penetration of GEVs.
Electric utilities are regional monopolies that distribute
electricity to consumers from either a wholesale market or their
own generating units.
In exchange for this state-granted
41. Id.
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monopoly power, utilities accept regulation by the state. 42
Utilities are further characterized by their service to the public
interest, their duty to serve all members of the public in their
respective territories, and their burden to charge reasonable
This regulatory compact is fundamental to
rates. 43
understanding the underpinnings of rate regulation, as it forms
the basis for the regulatory relationship between the public and a
utility. To manage this regulatory relationship, each state has
created an agency charged with regulating utilities, and, in New
York, the Public Service Commission serves this function. 44
The bulk of a utility regulatory agency’s job is to resolve the
central issue of “how much total revenue the utility should be
permitted to collect through the rates charged for its services.” 45
This total revenue figure is generally called a revenue
requirement. The components of a revenue requirement are: the
amount of money that an agency allows a utility to earn on its
assets based on a risk level necessary to attract investors, plus
the utility’s operating expenses. 46 The asset component of this
rate calculation is also called a rate base, and usually consists of
fixed investments that a utility has made on behalf of its
customers (e.g., poles, wires, transformers, substations,
electricity-generating units, and service trucks). 47 Once the
agency has held a rate proceeding and determined the total
revenue requirement it then designs electricity rates for each
customer class in order to generate the required revenue. 48

42. For a classic discussion of the nature of public utilities in the United
States, see generally Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the
Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837); Munn v. Ill., 94 U.S. 113 (1877); Smyth v.
Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
43. See generally Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. 420; Munn, 94 U.S. 113;
Smyth, 196 U.S. 466.
44. About the Department of Public Service, N.Y. STATE PUB. SERV. COMM’N,
http://www.dps.state.ny.us/New_aboutdps.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
45. Richard D. Cudahy & J. Robert Malko, Electric Peak Load Pricing:
Madison Gas and Beyond, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 47, 48-9 (citing PAUL J. GARFIELD &
WALLACE F. LOVEJOY, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 44-50 (1964)).
46. See id. at 49.
47. See JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 15963 (1961).
48. See id. at 52.
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At their most basic, customer/rate classes, or groups of users
who pay the same electricity rates as fellow class members, are
broken down into residential, commercial, and industrial units. 49
There are a host of factors that a regulatory agency may consider
when designing rate classes, the most important of which tend to
be consumer demand characteristics and usage type. 50
Geographic concerns come into consideration as well. 51 To avoid
charging customers for assets and services that they do not use,
and to make cost allocation easier, agencies ideally try to define
rate classes so that customers with similar demand profiles and
usage types (e.g., GEV owners) are grouped together. 52 Once an
agency defines a rate class, it is then able to design rates to
charge the customers in that class.
IV. ACHIEVING REGULATORY GOALS THROUGH
TIME-OF-USE RATES
A regulatory agency designs rate structures, as well as rate
classes, to further the general goals of rate regulation. As
enumerated by Congress in the Federal Public Utilities
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), rate regulation should seek to
conserve energy, optimize the efficiency of facilities and
resources, and provide consumers with equitable rates. 53 The
Supreme Court has deferentially echoed these goals, hinging its
constitutionally-informed, rate-related decisions on whether
given rates are just and reasonable. 54
In his oft-cited book, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES,
economist James C. Bonbright developed eight criteria for

49. See, e.g., Service Classifications, Statements, Addenda, CONSOL. EDISON,
INC., http://www.coned.com/rates/elec-sched3.asp (last visited Dec. 23, 2010).
50. See JONATHAN A. LESSER & LEONARDO R. GIACCHINO, FUNDAMENTALS OF
ENERGY REGULATION 144 (2007).
51. See id.
52. See BONBRIGHT, supra note 47, at 291-305 (discussing regulatory
objectives of rate structure).
53. Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611
(2006).
54. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307 (1989); Fed.
Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944).
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creating and evaluating a sound rate structure. 55 These criteria
are:
1. The
related
“practical”
attributes
of
simplicity,
understandability, public acceptability, and feasibility of
application.
2. Freedom from controversies as to proper interpretation.
3. Effectiveness in yielding total revenue requirements under
the fair-return standard.
4. Revenue stability from year to year.
5. Stability of the rates themselves, with a minimum of
unexpected changes seriously adverse to existing customers.
6. Fairness of the specific rates in the apportionment of total
cost of service among the different consumers.
7. Avoidance of “undue discrimination” in rate relationships.
8. Efficiency of rate classes and rate blocks in discouraging
wasteful use of service while promoting all justified types and
amounts of use. 56

According to Bonbright, the three most important criteria
to a sound rate structure are the third, sixth, and eighth. 57 By
ensuring a proper return on a utility’s asset base, successfully
fulfilling the third criterion provides for the economic viability of
the regulated corporation, clearly an important component of
ratemaking. 58 The sixth criterion, referring to a regulator’s
ability to fairly spread the total revenue requirement across rate
classes, highlights the basic principle behind rate class structure:
a customer should not have to pay for the utility investments that
he does not use. For example, industrial customers tend to have
different needs than residential customers, requiring different
infrastructure investments from a utility, such as a new
substation in an industrial area to handle high loads from which
a residential customer might draw no benefit. Different rate
schedules should, and do, reflect this divergence in needs. The
eighth criterion, echoed by Congress in PURPA, 59 stresses the
55.
49.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See BONBRIGHT, supra note 47, at 291; Cudahy & Malko, supra note 45, at
Cudahy & Malko, supra note 45, at 49.
See id. at 50.
See BONBRIGHT, supra note 47, at 291.
See 16 U.S.C. § 2601.
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significance of resource efficiency in utility regulation while
taking into account both environmental concerns about pollution
and economic concerns about resource scarcity.
It is important to judge the soundness of time-of-use rates as
an option with these criteria in mind, as “they remain the best
available guide to evaluating a particular rate design.” 60 In their
1976 article Electric Peak Load Pricing: Madison Gas and
Beyond, Richard D. Cudahy 61 & J. Robert Malko applied these
criteria, and found a host of benefits from implementing time-ofuse rates. 62 For instance, by implementing time-of-use rates,
which are much closer to the utilities’ actual costs of providing
service, regulators can decrease peak demand, conserve limited
energy resources, and provide an incentive to develop
technologies such as more efficient home appliances. 63
Overall, time-of-use rates enable “the individual customer to
contribute to the efficiency of the system and thereby achieve
favorable rate treatment.” 64 Time-of-use rates are so effective at
meeting the broad goals of rate regulation that Congress sought
to promote their widespread implementation when it passed
PURPA. 65 PURPA’s Section 2621(d)(3) reflects the high hopes
that Congress had for time-of-use rates:
The rates charged by any electric utility for providing electric
service to each class of electric consumers shall be on a time-ofday 66 basis which reflects the costs of providing electric service to
such class of electric consumers at different times of the day
unless such rates are not cost-effective with respect to such class,
as determined under section 2625(b) of this title. 67

60. Cudahy & Malko, supra note 45, at 50.
61. Richard D. Cudahy, Senior Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
7th Circuit, wrote this article while chairman of the Wisconsin Public Service
Commission.
62. See Cudahy & Malko, supra note 45, at 57-58, 68-72.
63. See id. at 58 (citing Charles J. Cicchetti, The Design of Electricity Tariffs,
96 PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY (1975)).
64. Id. at 69.
65. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621(d)(3), 2625(b).
66. “Time-of-day” rates and “time-of-use” rates are synonymous.
67. 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(3).
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Pursuant to section 2625(b), time-of-use rates are costeffective “if the long-run benefits of such rate to the electric utility
and its electric consumers in the class concerned are likely to
exceed the metering and communications costs and other costs
associated with the use of such rates.” 68
Utilities can recover their investment in smarter meters,
which are capable of measuring a customer’s usage based on the
time of day, through a slightly higher customer charge on a timeof-use customer’s monthly bill. 69 Depending on how much load
they can shift off-peak, time-of-use customers should see monthly
savings immediately. Put simply, for customers that can shift
their load, time-of-use rates are “cost-effective” under PURPA 70
and, as Cudahy & Malko describe, further the broader goals of
utility regulation. 71
V. CREATING A GEV RATE CLASS IN NEW YORK
STATE
Given all the benefits of time-of-use rates, one might wonder
why they have not been more widely implemented among
residential customers. The answer is simple: not all residential
customers can shift their energy use to off-peak hours so as to
lower their electricity bills. In fact, residential customers who are
unable to shift enough energy use off-peak could end up paying a
higher bill under a time-of-use rate schedule. This is where the
impending market penetration of GEVs presents a unique
situation. GEV owners will, for the most part, be residential
customers who pay a flat electricity rate. But, the electricity
demand of a person who uses a GEV will no longer match the
demand profile of most other residential customers. GEV owners
can, as already discussed, shift much of their electricity use to offpeak hours. In light of this fundamental schism in the demand
profile of residential customers, utility regulatory bodies should

68. 16 U.S.C. § 2625(b).
69. For a comparison of residential customer charges and time-of-use
customer charges, see generally SERVICE CLASSIFICATION NO. 1, supra note 31.
70. See 16 U.S.C. § 2625(b).
71. See Cudahy & Malko, supra note 45, at 68-72.
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carve out a separate rate class for GEV owners and mandate that
such a class be billed under a time-of-use rate schedule.
Utility regulatory agencies, including the New York State
Public Service Commission (PSC), have the power to create a new
rate class. 72 According to the New York Public Service Law:
The commission shall have power to require each. . .electric
corporation to establish classifications of service based upon the
quantity used, the time when used, the purpose for which used,
the duration of use and upon any other reasonable consideration,
and to establish in connection therewith just and reasonable
graduated rates and charges; and it shall have power, either
upon complaint or upon its own motion, to require such changes
in such classifications, rates and charges as it shall determine to
be just and reasonable. 73

By expressly delegating to the PSC the authority to create a
rate class based on the time of day when electricity is used and/or
based on the purpose of that use, the statute gives the PSC the
power to create a new rate class for GEV owners and to set the
rates for that class. Even if the New York Public Service Law
were not clear in its intent on the issue of rate class designation,
the discretion afforded to the PSC (and utility regulators in
general) in interpreting and applying such statutory guidance is
extremely high and would allow for the PSC to make such a
decision. 74
The Supreme Court has held, with respect to ratemaking,
that “[t]he Constitution is not designed to arbitrate these
economic niceties.” 75 In Federal Power Commission v. Natural
Gas Pipeline Co., the Supreme Court found that once a hearing
has been held and proper findings have been made, “the courts
cannot intervene in the absence of a clear showing that the limits
of due process have been overstepped.” 76 The Court further held
72. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. § 66(14) (2005).
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 2621 (providing broad goals to be achieved by state
regulatory bodies, but not mandating how, specifically, to regulate).
75. Duquesne Light Co., 488 U.S. at 314.
76. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942)
(“The Constitution does not bind rate-making bodies to the service of any single
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that “[i]f the Commission’s order, as applied to the facts before it
and viewed in its entirety, produces no arbitrary result, our
inquiry is at an end.” 77
This high level of deference to agency decision-making in
regulating the utility industry has been consistent at the New
York State level as well. In delineating the role of the court in
reviewing PSC decision-making, the Appellate Division and the
Court of Appeals of New York have found that:
“The business of rate making has been confided by the legislature
to a body of experts with powers of inquiry and modification
adequate to the task.”
However, once rates have been
established, it is for the courts to interpret the schedules, to
determine whether the schedules are applied as the Public
Service Commission established them, and to enforce those
schedules. 78

Therefore, once the PSC has gone through its decisionmaking process, New York courts will only determine whether
the PSC’s decision is being applied and enforced, and will not
review the merits of the PSC’s decision. Thus, given this highly
deferential standard of review, the PSC would not exceed its
statutory authority by creating a separate rate class for GEV
owners.

formula or combination of formulas. Agencies to whom this legislative power
has been delegated are free, within the ambit of their statutory authority, to
make the pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular
circumstances. Once a fair hearing has been given, proper findings made and
other statutory requirements satisfied, the courts cannot intervene in the
absence of a clear showing that the limits of due process have been overstepped.
If the Commission's order, as applied to the facts before it and viewed in its
entirety, produces no arbitrary result, our inquiry is at an end.”).
77. Id.
78. Columbia Gas of N.Y., Inc. v. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 289 N.Y.S.2d
339, 344 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) (quoting Judge Cardozo in City of Rochester v.
Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 134 N.E. 828, 832 (N.Y. 1922)). See N.Y. State
Council of Retail Merchants v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 45 N.Y.2d 661, 669-670 (N.Y.
1978) (“[W]e cannot say that the courts are entitled to substitute their judgment
for the evaluation of the commission, giving fair consideration to the expertise
possessed by the commission in weighing the impact of rate-fixing factors on
both the utilities and the consuming public and reaching the ultimate
determination as to how appropriately to proceed in this given instance.”).
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VI. STATUTORY IMPEDIMENTS TO A GEV RATE
CLASS ON A TIME-OF-USE RATE SCHEDULE
Even if the PSC were to create a new rate class for GEV
owners, one roadblock to implementing a time-of-use rate
schedule for those owners might still remain; the PSC’s
interpretation that Section 66(27)(a) of New York’s Public Service
Law 79 does not grant it the authority to mandate time-of-use
rates for a residential rate class. 80 However, given the legislative
history of Section 66(27) and the broad discretion afforded the
Commission, were the PSC to prudently change its position and
mandate time-of-use rates for GEV owners, it could do so both
within its discretion and in conformity with legislative intent.
As New York State’s utility regulatory body, the PSC has
only those powers conferred upon it by the legislature and those
powers that are “incident thereto and or necessarily implied
therefrom.” 81 Given this limitation, the PSC has been given both
“a broad mandate to ensure that all New Yorkers have access to
reliable and low-cost utility services,” 82 and the power to carry
As previously
out this mandate with broad discretion. 83
discussed, the impending adoption of GEVs will lead to higher
rates and the possible need for “significant additional generation
capacity,” unless time-of-use rates or a similar incentive to charge
off-peak is implemented. 84
In order to avoid such consequences, the PSC must encourage
off-peak charging by requiring that all GEV owners be billed for
their electricity consumption on a time-of-use rate schedule.
Unfortunately, the explicit statutory authority allowing the PSC
to mandate time-of-use rates “where it deems such rates to be in

79. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. § 66(27)(a).
80. See, e.g., In re Competitive Opportunities Regarding Elec. Serv., 2006 WL
2346389 at *7, *n.15 (Aug. 1, 2006).
81. Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 478 N.Y.S.2d 78, 82 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1984). See Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 388
N.Y.S.2d 157 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 3
N.Y.S.2d 581 (N.Y. App. Div. 1938), aff’d, 18 N.E.2d 287 (N.Y. 1938).
82. About the Department of Public Service, N.Y. STATE PUB. SERV. COMM’N,
http://www.dps.state.ny.us/New_aboutdps.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
83. See generally Fed. Power Comm’n, 315 U.S. 575.
84. See N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, supra note 29, at 4.
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the public interest” was removed from the New York Public
Service Law in 1997. 85
The section of the state Public Service Law pertinent to timeof-use rates currently reads:
Each electric corporation with annual gross revenues in excess of
two hundred million dollars shall offer the option of paying
charges on the basis of time-of-use rates for service to its
residential customers. . .Such electric corporations shall
periodically send a notice explaining the rates and informing
such customers and organizations that the rates are available. 86

Before the 1997 Amendment, section 66(27)(a)’s final
sentence read, “Nothing in this section shall prohibit the
commission from mandating such time-of-use rates where it
deems such rates to be in the public interest.” 87
Although there is no language in the Public Service Law
that actively prohibits the PSC from mandating time-of-use rates
for residential customers, the PSC has interpreted the 1997
amendment to have that effect. 88 Given the circumstances
surrounding the amendment and the legislative history, the PSC
appears to be carrying out New York State legislative intent
through its refusal to mandate time-of-use rates. 89
However, as the legislative history also shows, widespread
electric vehicle adoption was not within the minds of the
amendment drafters in 1997. 90 Thus, the PSC could, and should,
in light of the potential economic and environmental benefits to
ratepayers, reinterpret Section 66(27) of the New York Public
Service Law as not precluding the implementation of mandatory

85. S. Bill 4467, 1997-1998 Sess. (N.Y. 1997).
86. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 66(27)(a).
87. N.Y. S. Bill 4467.
88. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 66(27)(a); In re Competitive Opportunities
Regarding Elec. Serv., 2006 WL 2346389 at *7, *n.15 (stating that “The
Commission is not authorized to mandate time-of-use rates for residential
customers” and “Chapter 307 of the Laws of 1997 amended Public Service Law §
66(27)(a) to delete a provision authorizing the Commission to mandate time-ofuse rates for residential customers, in the public interest.”).
89. See N.Y. S. Bill 4467.
90. See id.
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time-of-use rates for residential GEV owners, who were clearly
beyond the foresight of the New York Legislature in 1997.
According to its Senate Bill Jacket, the 1997 amendment of
Section 66(27) of the New York Public Service Law constituted
“an act to amend the public service law, in relation to prohibiting
the public service commission from mandating the use of certain
rates for customers of electric corporations.” 91 The overwhelming
concern of the legislature was that “many customers, especially
large residential users and religious organizations are adversely
affected by time-of-use rates since they are not able to shift
energy usage to non-peak periods.” 92 The concern is a valid one.
Requiring users who could not shift their loads off-peak to take on
time-of-use rates that would cost them more is undesirable.
This change of policy followed an attempt by Con Edison to
implement a broad mandatory time-of-use rate schedule
promulgated by the PSC to promote energy conservation among
high-usage residential customers. 93 The negative consumer
response from these efforts is what ultimately drove the
legislature to amend the Public Service Law. 94 The PSC and Con
Edison had wrongly assumed that high-usage residential
customers would adapt to the new rates, and the public backlash
was strong. 95 Accordingly, the PSC has held that a residential
customer’s voluntary consent is particularly important in time-ofuse rate programs targeting submetered residential buildings;
the concern being that tenants might unknowingly be put on
time-of-use rates at their landlords’ behests. 96
91. Id.
92. Id. (Introducer’s Memorandum in Support).
93. See BARBARA ALEXANDER, SMART METERS, REAL TIME PRICING, AND
DEMAND RESPONSE PROGRAMS: IMPLICATIONS FOR LOW INCOME ELECTRIC
CUSTOMERS 5, 52 (2007), available at http://www.pulp.tc/Smart_Meters__
Real_Time.pdf (report prepared for U.S. Department of Energy).
94. See N.Y. S. Bill 4467 (Memorandum to Council to the Governor from
General Counsel for Department of Public Service).
95. See ALEXANDER, supra note 93, at 5 (“New York previously had a
mandatory time of use rate for very high usage residential electric customers.
Despite the presumed ability of very high usage customers to adapt to time of
use rates, the program was so unpopular the state legislature amended the law
to make any residential time of use program voluntary.”).
96. Declaratory Ruling on the Submetering of Residential Customers at
Time-of-use Rates, No. 04-E-1335, 2005 WL 1353616, at * 4 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
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Thus, the overriding theme behind the legislature’s 1997
amendment, and the PSC’s interpretation of it, has been a desire
to protect the often under-informed and non-consenting consumer
from paying higher electric bills because of an inability to shift
usage off-peak after having been placed on a time-of-use rate
schedule. But, GEV owners, by their very nature, do not fall into
this class of customers that the 1997 amendment aimed to
protect.
For one, GEV owners would be more informed than the
average residential customer, let alone the uninformed
submetered tenant. Purchasing a GEV necessitates interaction
with a utility. A GEV owner will typically need to install a new
high amp wall charger in his home for overnight charging. The
utility will be involved in this process. Moreover, rather than
being a passive consumer whose electricity bill might be changed
by a utility under a mandatory time-of-use schedule, a GEV
owner will have presumably thought about the electricity billing
implications of plugging in his car, and would likely even be
aware of the environmental benefits of plugging in during offpeak hours.
The second concern with regard to imposing time-of-use
rates on residential customers is that those customers will not be
able to shift their energy use off-peak. Similarly, this concern
does not apply to GEV owners as it might to average residential
customers. GEV owners can inherently shift a large portion of
their electricity use off-peak with minimal effort. At the most
burdensome, a GEV owner would plug in his car at 10:00 P.M.
instead of at 6:00 P.M. when he came home from work. More
likely, though, the owner could install a timer on his charging
outlet and set it for 10:00 P.M. when he arrives home. Ideally –
and in the not-too-distant future, realistically – the GEV will be
integrated with smart grid technology and the owner could

Comm’n June 8, 2005), available at http://www3.dps.state.ny.us/pscweb/
WebFileRoom.nsf/0/81EAF848232FE1C7852570
1900470935/$File/04e1335.06.08.05.pdf?OpenElement
(“Submetering
plans
proposing to implement . . . TOU rates must provide a means for customers to
actively choose whether or not they wish to take service under such rates.
Submeterers also should hold informational meetings with residents to explain
the proposed . . . TOU rates and to answer residents’ questions.”).
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manage her usage on a real-time basis from a computer or smartphone.
VII. A PATH FOR THE PSC
The impending adoption of GEV’s throughout New York
State poses a new challenge to regulators – one that was not
addressed by the legislature’s 1997 amendment “prohibiting the
public service commission from mandating the use of certain
rates for customers.” 97 The challenge is to effectively mitigate
the potential price spikes and increased GHG emissions
stemming from GEV-related peak demand increases.
While currently available voluntary time-of-use rates may
encourage some owners to switch rate schedules, historical data
show that customers will not take advantage of such rates. 98
Therefore, to ensure that GEV owners – who, in their decision to
drive a GEV have demonstrated, at minimum, an awareness of
environmental and energy costs – actually help the environment
and realize lower energy costs, the PSC should interpret the 1997
amendment to Section 66(27) of the New York Public Service Law
with particular attention to its twin underlying concerns: the
desire to protect (1) uninformed ratepayers who (2) cannot shift
load off-peak. The PSC need not worry about either concern with
respect to GEV owners and should view this novel class of
ratepayers as beyond the intent and purview of the 1997
amendment, enabling the Commission to require that owners of
GEVs pay for their electricity on a time-of-use rate schedule.
Seen from a macro perspective, a move by the PSC to put
GEV owners on time-of-use rate schedules would send a message
that New York State is serious about reaping the environmental
and economic benefits of the coming boom in electric vehicle use.
Creating a GEV-owner rate class that can easily shift its
electricity demand to times when demand is low, and encouraging

97. N.Y. S. Bill 4467.
98. See SERVICE CLASSIFICATION NO. 1, supra note 31, at 3. One reason that
customers have failed to switch to time-of-use rates is because of a lack of
accessible data to show that such a switch would be economically wise. Utilities
may be in the best position to single out which customers would benefit from
voluntary time-of-use rates but few utilities have taken this step.
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that rate class to make that shift, would not only decrease peak
use and the concurrent need for dirty, inefficient generators, but
also provide built-in demand for homegrown wind energy.
Ultimately, the PSC is charged with protecting consumers
from high electricity rates. Creating a time-of-use rate schedule
for a GEV owner rate class would protect residential customers
from rate increases. GEV owners have different needs and
demand profiles from those of residential customers. If kept in a
residential rate class on a flat rate schedule, GEV owners would
have no incentive to charge off-peak. Peak demand would
increase on an already-stressed electric grid, leading to the
expanded use of older, less efficient, dirtier, more expensive
generators, which, in turn, would lead to higher rates and more
air pollution. The PSC should not allow the near-term solution to
the transportation fuel inflexibility problem to lead to rate
increases and environmental degradation. Creating a new rate
class for GEV owners and charging that class on time-of-use rates
would help avoid these problems, and ultimately help New York
State become more energy independent and environmentally
benevolent, while setting an example for other states to follow.
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